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Executive Summary
In April 2016, diplomats, experts and civil society actors from around the world 
will gather for three days at a rare Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York, called to address the world drug problem (UNGASS 2016). 
In some quarters, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, UNGASS 2016 is seen as 
a moment to rethink global drug control strategies. In other regions, UNGASS 2016 
is viewed somewhat differently, as a time to build upon and strengthen the current 
approach to drug policy, as set out in a current Plan of Action adopted in 2009. 
Throughout 2015, United Nations University (UNU) – a global think tank established 
by the UN General Assembly, and charged with contributing, through collaborative 
research, to collective efforts to resolve pressing global challenges – has been 
gathering stakeholders in a series of meetings at United Nations (UN) headquarters 
in New York, aimed at “Identifying Common Ground” ahead of UNGASS 2016. 
These meetings have addressed the relationship between contemporary global 
drug policy and public health, human rights, development and criminal justice. 
These meetings have been attended by delegates from more than 50 UN Member 
States, as well as representatives of 16 UN entities and 55 civil society and 
academic organizations. 
Drawing on these consultations, this Policy Report outlines how the global 
drug control system works, including recent trends; describes three major 
perspectives going into UNGASS 2016: Orthodoxy, Scepticism and Swing Voting; 
explores the likely outcome of UNGASS 2016; and makes recommendations for 
strengthening that outcome. 
The trend heading into UNGASS 2016 is becoming clear: Member States will largely 
coalesce around an affirmation of the existing regime, coupled with a call for flexibility 
in implementation of that regime. The United States and some Latin American 
countries have called for flexibility as a way to experiment with new approaches to 
implementing the existing drug control regime. Other states will, however, likely 
treat an agreement on flexibility as an acceptable response to their calls for respect 
for state sovereignty in setting domestic drug policy, including the use of strong 
punitive approaches.
 
There is consequently a danger that flexibility will lead, in time and after UNGASS 
2016 is complete, to policy fragmentation: in practice, flexibility will mean very 
different things in different parts of the world, including being seen in some 
countries as lending support to existing, repressive drug control policies. We argue 
that the key to avoiding this outcome – fragmentation – is to ensure that flexibility is 
not treated as a code-word for unprincipled laissez faire, but instead is embedded 
in a process of collective drug policy development at the UN, based on a more 
detailed and holistic analysis by Member States and other stakeholders of ‘what 
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works’ in drug policy interventions. UNGASS 2016, we argue, should be seen not 
as the end of a conversation about drug policy, but as an opportunity to set up a 
structured and inclusive conversation between 2016 and 2019, when the current 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action comes to an end, and a new one will likely  
be adopted. We argue that UNGASS 2016 should initiate a conversation that, 
though leaving room for states to exercise flexibility and discretion, ensures that 
their policy choices are guided by three principles: 1) protection of human rights;  
2) promotion of human development; and 3) guidance by the best available 
scientific evidence. We describe this as an approach based not simply on flexibility 
but on principled pluralism. 
The Policy Report explores how four key issues will likely play out at UNGASS 2016 
– penal policy, public health, development, and human rights – and identifies five 
areas of potential common ground that could set the stage for a discussion based 
on principled pluralism. On penal policy, we argue that while criminal justice and law 
enforcement-based approaches have been at the centre of global drugs policy for 
many decades, questions relating to penal policy – the role of capital, custodial and 
other forms of punishment – are central to drug policy debates in many parts of the 
world, going into UNGASS 2016. We show that many states are rethinking the role 
of domestic penal policy in drug control, experimenting with non-criminal penalties 
for minor drug offences, or diverting drug users into non-custodial intervention 
programmes encompassing medical, psychological, social services, employment 
and training, and other types of support and rehabilitation. Yet some states believe 
that questions of penal policy – including the use of the death penalty – are internal 
matters, not appropriately discussed in international forums. While we can expect 
the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document to emphasize the importance of respect 
for proportionality, human rights and the rule of law, this will in part be due to the 
creative ambiguity these broad terms offer. Recognizing these constraints, our 
recommendation encourages accelerated action to develop a shared evidence base 
for global policy discussions in this area:
Recommendation 1 – Penal Policy
Accelerate evidence sharing on drug control 
penal policy outcomes
UNGASS 2016 should create a forum to encourage states, international 
organizations, academics and civil society to share robust scientific evidence about 
a wide range of drug control penal policy interventions and their outcomes. This 
forum could provide a platform for South-South and triangular cooperation, and 
encourage the development of a stronger evidence base on penal policy ahead of 
the adoption of a new Political Declaration and Plan of Action in 2019.
On public health, we note that the promotion of the “health and welfare of 
mankind” is the central policy objective of the entire international drug control 
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regime. We also note that there is also broad consensus among Member States 
around the importance of a focus on public health in drug policy. Two major 
public health areas will likely be debated at UNGASS 2016: access to controlled 
medicines and treatment for people with substance abuse problems, including 
harm reduction measures. We canvas the positions of a variety of Member States, 
international organizations, and key external stakeholders. Since the adoption 
of the 2009 Political Declaration, states have routinely reiterated the need for a 
“balanced and integrated” approach to drug policy – i.e. balancing law enforcement 
with public health. However, significant tensions have emerged in recent years 
not only over what that “balance” means in practice, but also over the weight that 
states should afford to different forms and sources of medical and public health 
expertise in deciding how to control specific substances. Given these tensions, 
our recommendations in this area suggest UNGASS 2016 initiate processes to 
provide objective, evidence-based analysis of – and opportunities for – global 
access to controlled medicines and greater system-wide coherence across the UN in 
drug disorder treatment:
Recommendation 2 – Access to Controlled Medicines
Establish a High-Level Independent Commission on access to 
controlled medicines
UNGASS 2016 should establish an high-level, independent, expert commission, 
supported by WHO, to analyse global access to controlled medicines and report 
back to the General Assembly or the UN Economic and Social Council, via the UN 
Secretary-General, on measures to improve it. 
Recommendation 3 – Drug Dependence Treatment
Develop UN-wide guidance on treatment of drug use disorders
UNGASS 2016 should request the Secretary-General to develop coherent, UN-
system-wide guidance on drug treatment programming, for application across UN 
programming contexts. 
On development, we highlight how drug control policy choices will impact several 
aspects of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, not only Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 3.5 (substance abuse treatment), but also SDG 1 (End 
Poverty), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Settlements), and SDG 16 (Peace and 
Justice, Strong Institutions). In adopting this agenda, UN Member States have 
already signalled their acceptance of sustainable development as a universal policy 
agenda, suggesting a willingness to move past rigid developed v. developing 
country thinking – including in dealing with substance abuse and drug control 
concerns. We demonstrate that some countries are ready to revisit global drug 
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control policy, precisely because they recognize that new approaches might 
unlock new development resources. However, global drug policy discussions 
continue to treat development as a marginal, not integral, aspect of effective 
drug control policy. Alternative development projects aim to provide alternative 
livelihoods and other forms of development support to communities displaced 
from illicit drug crop production by supply reduction measures. But programmes 
often reflect out-dated thinking about the economic geography of drug markets, 
focusing more on rural, agricultural producer communities than on urban producer 
and trafficking communities. If alternative development programming is to move 
from being a tool of charitable giving to a strategic tool driving pro-development 
community transformation, this will have to change. And in order for development 
considerations to be more fully integrated into global drug policy choices, we argue, 
states will need to reflect on their development impacts at the human, household, 
national and global levels. We offer an operational recommendation for moving 
this discussion forward:
Recommendation 4 – Human Development and Drug Control Metrics
Build new pro-development metrics to help prepare the next 
Political Declaration
Building on current discussions on drug control indicators for SDG 3.5 in the Inter-
Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators and the UN Statistical Commission, 
UNGASS 2016 should call on the UN Statistical Commission to initiate a formal 
workstream to develop new metrics measuring the human development impacts of 
drugs and drug control policies. If possible, such data should begin to be collected 
by national statistical agencies ahead of 2019, to inform the preparation of a new 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action. 
On human rights, we note that while the three existing drug control Conventions 
do not specifically reference human rights, it is clear that states are obliged 
to read the Conventions in light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and to implement their Convention obligations in ways that respect human 
rights. This is recognized in the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action, 
and in other products of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has detailed how some drug policy choices 
negatively impact human rights in the areas of penal policy, protection of children, 
indigenous people’s rights, and non-discrimination. We explain, however, that 
the elevation of human rights considerations within global drug policy will not 
go unopposed. As with matters of penal policy, some states see discussion of 
human rights as beyond the purview of the global drug control institutions. 
Given these political realities, we suggest that UNGASS 2016 focuses its efforts 
in this area on encouraging system-wide coherence within the UN system:
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Recommendation 5 – Human Rights
Develop UN-wide guidance on protection of human rights  
in drug programming
UNGASS 2016 should request the Secretary-General to task the UN System 
Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking to develop a 
system-wide policy on protection of human rights in drug-related programming. 
This should operationalize, and build upon, the existing UN Human Rights 
Due Diligence Policy. 
The Report closes with a sixth, procedural recommendation aimed at creating a 
space for further discussion of global drug policy between 2016 and 2019, based on 
principled pluralism, with four characteristics: it should be 1) inclusive; 2) driven by 
science; 3) pro-development; and 4) human rights protecting:
Recommendation 6 – Towards 2019
Create an Open Working Group on Drug Policy to prepare  
Global Drug Policy Goals for adoption in 2019
UNGASS 2016 should establish an Open Working Group on Drug Policy 
(OWGDP). The OWGDP should sit in New York between UNGASS 2016 and 
2019, and present a proposal to the UN General Assembly for a new Political 
Declaration and Plan of Action, including measurable Global Drug Policy Goals. 
The OWGDP should draw its inspiration from the Open Working Group that 
produced the Sustainable Development Goals, including its troika system for state 
representation, and its extensive consultations with the UN system, civil society 
and interested stakeholders. The OWGDP should include an expert Scientific 
Advisory Committee, supported by World Health Organization, modelled on 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change process (and thus including not 
only Member State officials but also independent scientific experts), tasked with 
reviewing and summarizing the state of global scientific knowledge in specific 
issues areas, such as penal policy, drugs and development, and drugs and public 
health. The OWGDP should also include a Human Rights Advisory Committee, 
tasked with ensuring that the OWGDP’s proposal respects human rights.
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Introduction
In April 2016, diplomats, experts and civil society actors from around the world 
will gather for three days at a rare Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York, called to address the world drug problem (UNGASS 2016). 
This gathering reflects a growing sense in some quarters, particularly in the Western 
Hemisphere, that the so-called ‘War on Drugs’ has failed, and that global drug 
policy needs rethinking. 
The broad contours of global drug policy were set in three global drug control 
conventions adopted in 1961, 1971 and 1988 (discussed further in Part 1). Member 
States periodically adopts a Political Declaration and Plan of Action to set out how 
these Conventions will be implemented.1 Progress is more or less continuously 
monitored by the 53-country, Vienna-based UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND). The current Political Declaration and Plan of Action, adopted in 2009, will 
expire in 2019. There is, however, growing concern that the current approach to 
drug control is not only failing to achieve its stated goal – the elimination of the use 
and trade of illicit narcotics – but also causing a wide range of negative, unintended 
consequences. In 2012, Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia convinced the rest of 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly – some 190 other countries – to hold an 
extraordinary Special Session to discuss the world drug problem, three years ahead of 
the next expected review in 2019. 
Throughout 2015, United Nations University (UNU) – a global think tank established 
by the UN General Assembly, and charged with contributing, through collaborative 
research to collective efforts to resolve the pressing global challenges – has been 
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gathering stakeholders in a series of meetings aimed at “Identifying Common 
Ground” ahead of UNGASS 2016. These meetings have been attended by 
representatives of over 50 countries, 16 UN entities, and 55 civil society and academic 
organizations. Drawing on these consultations, this Policy Report explains the 
major perspectives ahead of UNGASS 2016, explores its likely outcomes and makes 
recommendations for strengthening them. 
In Part 1, we explain how the global drug control system is working. Part 2 describes 
three major perspectives going into UNGASS 2016: Orthodoxy, Scepticism and 
Swing Voting. We argue that these will likely interact to create a consensus at 
UNGASS 2016 around the idea of national flexibility in the implementation of the 
existing drug control Conventions. We highlight the risk of this flexibility morphing 
into fragmentation, and suggest steps to encourage, instead, principled pluralism in 
global drug policy: allowing states room for scientifically-based, pro-development 
policy experimentation while protecting human rights. Part 3 examines how four key 
issues will likely play out at UNGASS 2016 – penal policy, public health, development, 
and human rights – and identifies five areas of potential common ground. Finally, in 
Part 4, we argue that states should use UNGASS 2016 to set up a global conversation 
on drug policy, running through 2019, with four characteristics: it should be 1) 
inclusive; 2) driven by science; 3) pro-development; and 4) human rights protecting. 
After reviewing recent UN practice in similar global policy discussions, we recommend 
that UNGASS 2016 establishes a new multi-stakeholder Open Working Group on 
Drug Policy, modelled on the one that designed the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, to develop a new global drug policy incorporating Global Drug Control 
Goals, for adoption in 2019.
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Rethinking international drug control
the regime
The international drug control system is established by three major conventions 
adopted over the last half century, which must also be read in the light of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
adopted in 1961 and amended by a 1972 Protocol, is the cornerstone of the regime. 
It establishes a global drug control system, placing manufacturing, possession, 
trade and use restrictions on specific psycho-active substances such as cannabis, 
heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine, with the object of promoting the “health and 
welfare of mankind”. The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances expanded 
the scope of this global control regime to include psychotropic substances.2 
The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances additionally requires countries to work individually and 
together to criminalize and combat the illicit drug trade.3 While characterizing 
“addiction to narcotics drugs” as “a serious evil for the individual and … fraught 
with social and economic danger to mankind”, this regime pledges access to 
controlled medicines for the relief of pain and suffering.4 There is consequently 
a tension built into global drug policy from the outset, recognizing narcotics 
as a source of both social harms and social goods. That tension, and how to 
manage it, remains at the heart of the global drug policy debate to this day. 
The official venue for that debate is the United Nations Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND), an intergovernmental body created in 1946 that sits 
in Vienna and reports to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
CND reviews and amends the global schedules of prohibited and controlled 
narcotics, after receiving recommendations from the Expert Committee on Drug 
1
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Dependence (ECDD) of the World Health Organization (WHO), which evaluates 
the medical properties and abuse potential of specific substances. CND also 
makes non-binding recommendations about the broader implementation 
of the Conventions. While the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC, in New 
York, include 193 Member States, the CND comprises just 53 of these states. 
Since many countries do not have diplomatic representation in Vienna, they 
rarely sit on CND, giving them limited and infrequent participation. CND 
decisions are, like many in the UN, made by consensus, meaning that each 
Member State can block any decision it does not like. CND guides the UN’s 
programmatic efforts to assist Member States in discharging their Convention 
obligations, mainly carried out by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
also based in Vienna. CND leads the preparations for UNGASS 2016.
While CND provides a forum for global drug policy discussions, the task of officially 
interpreting those Conventions falls to the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB), an independent, quasi-judicial expert body comprised of 13 individual 
members, notionally serving in their individual capacity. INCB monitors the 
control system, including through country visits to assess state compliance, 
and supports states’ efforts to comply.5 All members are elected by ECOSOC; 
10 from a list provided by states, three from a list provided by the WHO.6 
The control regime is primarily implemented by Member States themselves, 
through a range of regulatory, law enforcement, and medical mechanisms. They 
receive some support from UN entities, notably UNODC. Headquartered in 
Vienna, UNODC has a field presence in all regions, providing technical support 
to Member States in their efforts to discharge their Convention obligations. It 
also provides important analysis and research to the global community, such as 
the annual World Drug Report, which provides a global overview of the trends 
in production, trafficking and consumption of major illicit substances.7 UNODC 
also serves as the Secretariat for the key Conventions and governance bodies 
in this field. Ninety per cent of UNODC’s budget comes from voluntary state 
contributions, rather than the regular UN budget approved by the General 
Assembly,8 making UNODC particularly responsive to those states that finance it. 
Beyond UNODC, and the ECDD, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also 
contribute to efforts to support states’ drug control-related programming. For 
example, one goal guiding the current strategic plan of UNAIDS is to prevent all 
new HIV infections among people who use drugs,9 and the 2011 Political Declaration 
on HIV and AIDS calls on states to “Reduce transmission of HIV among people who 
inject drugs by 50% by 2015”.10 UNDP assists states in many areas that intersect 
with drug policy, including livelihoods, poverty eradication, health and HIV/AIDS, 
and governance and rule of law.11 As we explore further in Part 3, the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has also recently begun 
to identify the impacts of drug control policies on human rights as an area of 
concern.12 And the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has drawn attention 
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to the impact of drug trafficking on political stability.13 Since 2011, these different 
UN entities have attempted to coordinate their work in this field through a UN 
System Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking.
is it working?
Although this regime has been operating for over fifty years, progress towards 
achieving its objective, as most recently articulated in the 2009 Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action – to “minimize and eventually eliminate the availability and use 
of illicit drugs and psychotropic substances” – has not been convincing. UNODC 
itself estimates that global illicit drug use is stable at around five per cent of the 
global population.14 UNODC estimates 246 million people used at least one illicit 
substance in 2013, with 10 per cent of this population suffering from drug use 
disorders or drug dependence.15 (WHO, with slightly different definitions and data, 
puts the dependence figure at around 60% of the UNODC number.16) While coca 
bush cultivation appears, uncertainly, to have declined in recent years, in 2014 
global opium production was recorded at its highest level since the late 1930s. New 
cannabis production techniques are producing higher yields with higher potency 
products, and seizure data indicates a rapid expansion of the global market for 
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), as noted by UNODC.17 
Rapid commercial innovation in new psychoactive substances (NPS) poses 
particular challenges for effective control. Some NPS appear to have similar effects 
to scheduled substances, yet remain unscheduled by CND and therefore freely 
available.18 The scientific evidence on the toxicology and overdose risk of these 
substances is limited, challenging the international drug control system to keep 
up.19 But the market does not wait: in Europe, 101 new NPS were identified in 
2014, bringing the number of NPS monitored to more than 450. This is double the 
entire number of all substances currently controlled under the global drug control 
system. Over half of these were first reported after 2011.20 Some governments also 
express alarm about innovation in sales methods. The sale of illicit narcotics via 
encrypted sites on the internet – the so-called ‘Dark Net’ – also poses challenges 
for governments and the global drug control system. The best-known example 
is the now-defunct Silk Road website: it reportedly had annual sales revenues 
of USD 22 million before it was shut down.21 Law enforcement responses have 
included traditional surveillance, interdiction and prosecution, but this approach is 
constrained in countries with limited technological capacity, and has also on occasion 
raised privacy and human rights concerns.22 
The illicit global drug market, beyond the reach of effective state regulation, 
causes major social harm. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has identified, 
drug trafficking and drug abuse can wreak immense damage on communities and 
individuals, and pose a major obstacle to sustainable development and poverty 
eradication.23 Opiates are the major source of overdose deaths worldwide.24 This 
is not a problem isolated to poorly resourced states: in the United States, nearly 
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7,000 people are seen in emergency rooms each day as a result of abuse of 
prescription opioids, and on average 44 people die from prescription painkiller 
overdose daily.25 Heroin addiction is growing rapidly in the United States, with three-
quarters of heroin addicts having previously been users of prescription opioids.26 
Moreover, intravenous injection of opiates spreads HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C; 
outside sub-Saharan Africa, people who inject drugs account for 30 per cent of all 
new HIV infections.27 
Worldwide, total retail sales for the black market in drugs are valued at USD 320 
billion annually,28 and both the commodities on offer and the routes by which they 
are traded continue to evolve. Despite several decades of the US-led ‘War on Drugs’ 
– a term that government now, as we discuss further below, officially shuns29 –  
Latin America remains the major global source of cocaine, and Afghanistan and 
Myanmar remain the major sources of heroin – though it, too, is making a return in 
Latin America. The routes through which these precious illegal commodities are 
trafficked to market are persistently tainted by corruption, political instability and 
violence.30 A growing body of evidence suggests that when new drug trafficking 
routes are carved out – for example over the last decade from Latin America through 
West Africa to Europe – the advent of the drug trade intersects with underlying 
political and conflict dynamics in ways that may significantly complicate conflict 
prevention and resolution.31 In contrast to heroin and cocaine, however, ATS and 
new psychoactive substances (NPS) are increasingly manufactured, and consumed, 
worldwide. Cannabis – a weed – is increasingly easily grown just about anywhere.32 
Governments have however not only expressed concern about the ability of the 
global drug control regime to keep up with market developments; some have also 
expressed concern about the unintended consequences of a half-century’s efforts 
to repress that market. The law-enforcement first, sometimes militarized approach 
known by the shorthand ‘War on Drugs’ is now seen in Latin America, in particular, 
as contributing to the violence and crime associated with the global drug trade.33 
As UNODC has stated the “strongest case against drug control is the violence 
and corruption associated with the black market.” In “attempting to [eliminate 
drug use]”, UNODC has concluded, heavy-handed approaches to implementing 
prohibitionist policies “have indirectly enriched dangerous criminals, who kill and 
bribe their way from the countries where drugs are produced to the countries 
where drugs are consumed”.34 State institutions and political processes can be 
threatened by “drug cartels [who] have the means to buy protection, political 
support or votes at every level of government and society”.35 As UNDP recently 
drew attention to, some drug trafficking organizations are in control of significant 
territories and populations, often perpetrating significant human rights abuses in 
the process, and fomenting insecurity for citizens.36 At the same time, military and 
police interventions into such spaces risk significant human, economic, physical 
and social collateral damage, as entire neighbourhoods are destabilized and 
people are forcibly displaced. UNODC itself has identified a number of negative 
“unintended consequences” arising from current international drug control policies, 
summarized in Figure 1. 
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According to UNODC, the unintended consequences  
of current drug policies include:
Black market: the creation of a lucrative and violent criminal 
black market for drugs of macroeconomic proportions. 
Policy displacement from health to law enforcement, drawing 
public resources and political attention away from public health 
considerations towards law enforcement and security. 
Geographical displacement as crackdowns on drug production 
and trade push them, and with them, crime, violence, and 
destabilization, to new geographic areas. 
Substance displacement: the unwitting creation of incentives for 
users to switch from heavily policed drugs to a drug with similar 
effects with less stringent controls, creating new patterns of 
drug use and markets. 
Criminalization and marginalization of people who use drugs, 
often amplified through the use of the criminal justice system 
to address drug use and minor possession. Drug-related 
incarceration rates are, in many countries, highest amongst 
young, poor, marginalized populations, often having lifelong – 
or even, in some cases, multi-generational – consequences on 
human and social development.37
Growing evidence of these unintended negative consequences has also raised  
serious questions about the opportunity costs incurred. With global drug 
enforcement apparently costing around USD 100 billion annually,38 there is a real 
question as to whether these funds could be more productively spent in other ways 
with a more positive development pay-off. To date, however, the resources allocated 
to social programming and demand reduction efforts in the implementation of 
the global drug control regime are dwarfed by law enforcement spending. One 
estimate suggests that 70 per cent of drug control expenditures go towards supply 
reduction measures.39
Concern about the social impacts of law-enforcement focused approaches has been 
growing in some quarters for several decades. Beginning in the late 1970s, a few 
countries in Europe began to supplement criminal justice-based methods for dealing 
 Figure 1
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with drug users with public health-based approaches, combining supply and demand 
reduction with what came to be known as harm reduction (a concept we explore 
further in Part 3). In the late 1970s, The Netherlands relaxed enforcement of criminal 
penalties for limited possession and supply of cannabis and certain hallucinogens.40 
In the early 1990s, Switzerland adopted a four-pillar drug policy combining efforts 
to prevent drug use, therapy for drug dependence, harm reduction, and law 
enforcement. This controversially included the use of opioid-assisted treatment and 
rehabilitation.41 And in 2000, Portugal instated a new drug policy decriminalizing the 
use of all drugs and creating a system focused on harm reduction and health services 
for people who use drugs.42 
a crossroads?
These European experiments have, in the last five years, been followed by new 
drug policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere, likewise aiming to minimize 
the social harms caused not only by drugs, but also by drug control measures. 
Together, these initiatives have created a growing sense that global drug policy is 
approaching a crossroads.43 
Frustrated in its efforts to have traditional uses of coca leaf excluded from the 
global control regime, in January 2012 the Bolivian government became the first 
to leave the 1961 Single Convention, rejoining in February 2013 after adopting a 
legal reservation that gave it room to create a regulated domestic market for coca 
leaves.44 Uruguay is now rolling out a regulated, national market for recreational 
consumption of cannabis, forthrightly arguing that such personal use is a protected 
private matter, notwithstanding Convention language indicating that the availability 
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of scheduled drugs should be limited to medical and scientific purposes.45 The 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has established a regional commission to conduct 
research on the health and legal implications of cannabis decriminalization.46 In 
Vancouver, Canada, the city council has approved plans to regulate its existing illegal 
medical cannabis shop market, including by setting zoning rules and licensing fees.47 
In the US, the Obama administration acquiesces in experiments with cannabis law 
liberalization at the state level that go even further, allowing for the development 
of commercial suppliers and distributors. Currently, medical marijuana is legal in 23 
US states, recreational possession and use of marijuana has been decriminalized 
in 18 states, and recreational use is legal in four states and Washington D.C.48 
(Decriminalization generally involves the removal or suspension of application of 
criminal penalties for legal infractions associated with personal drug use (but may 
leave other penalties in place), whereas legalization removes all penalties associated 
with personal use, and may allow for personal cultivation and/or a legal, regulated 
market as well.) Expectations are high that California – the fifth largest economy 
in the world – will vote on similar reforms in November 2016. And while US federal 
officials describe the moves at the state level to create a legal, regulated cannabis 
market as illegal under federal law, they are not only refraining from enforcing that 
law, but also removing obstacles to suppliers accessing the financial system.49 
The US Office of National Drug Control Policy and the Department of Justice have 
also promoted reforms of the federal criminal justice system’s handling of drug 
offenders.50 Under the 2013 Smart on Crime Initiative, the Obama administration has 
initiated sentencing reforms for low-level, non-violent drug convictions, and is also 
advocating for changes to federal mandatory minimum sentences.51 Recognizing 
racial disparities in some drug-offence sentencing guidelines, the United States 
Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, reducing sentencing discrepancies for 
cocaine and crack-cocaine that had placed an undue burden on minorities.52 The 
US Department of Justice is coordinating the early release of a large numbers 
of prisoners based on revised sentencing guidelines, and President Obama has 
gone so far as to use federal clemency powers to reduce some existing drug 
related sentences.53 
These sub-national and national initiatives have been reinforced by a regional 
process providing political top-cover for innovation throughout the Americas. 
The Organization of American States now openly countenances scenarios in 
which governments move away from prohibitionist policies. A major May 2013 
OAS Report on the Drug Problem in Americas identified possible ways forward, 
including decriminalization and legalization.54 In June 2013, the Organization of 
American States adopted a new declaration on drugs entitled For a Comprehensive 
Policy Against the World Drug Problem in the Americas, which suggests that new 
experiences and approaches taken by governments may usefully inform global policy 
and encourage broad and open debate on the world drug problem.55 
These calls for a rethink of global drug control orthodoxy have not, however, gone 
unremarked. For instance, when Switzerland moved to support heroin-assisted 
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drug treatment, INCB called on the WHO to review the program.56 INCB showed 
similar dissatisfaction with Portugal’s decriminalization law, and of reform initiatives 
in Uruguay and Bolivia.57 Most recently, it has indicated that the permissive 
approach to cannabis being taken in several states has put the US in breach of its 
international treaty obligations.58 The US’ response has been to call for flexibility in 
the interpretation of the global prohibition framework.59 
This is the context in which Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia successfully pushed 
for the next major discussion of global drug policy scheduled at the UN for 2019 – 
when the UN’s 10-year Political Declaration and Plan of Action on drug control will 
expire – to be brought forward to 2016. To generate a broader discussion about drug 
policy than the CND allows, these Latin American countries secured agreement that 
the meeting would be held by the General Assembly in New York.60 The result is a 
rare UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the world drug problem, 
scheduled for 19-21 April 2016 – UNGASS 2016. In the next section, we explain the 
three broad strands of opinion that are likely to be present in UNGASS 2016, and 
consider how they interact. 
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Perspectives going into UNGASS 2016
The scheduling of UNGASS 2016 has been interpreted – particularly in those parts 
of global civil society that advocate for drug policy reform – as a sign that UN drug 
policy may be at a turning-point. Expectations have been raised in some quarters 
that UNGASS may consider reforming the legal framework for global drug control, 
encourage states to move away from a heavy focus on criminal justice towards more 
public health-oriented policies, and perhaps even consider rescheduling or legalizing 
some currently prohibited substances, notably cannabis.61 
As preparations for UNGASS 2016 have unfurled, however, it has become clear that 
at least two of these three expectations are set to be comprehensively dashed: 
the appetite amongst Member States to raise the thorny issue of legalization is 
extremely limited,62 and treaty reform is decisively off the UNGASS 2016 agenda. The 
formal debate will start from the presumption that all states will continue to operate 
within the confines of the existing Conventions. As we explore further below, while 
there will be support from many states for considering the public health impacts of 
current drug control measures, it increasingly appears that UNGASS 2016 will leave 
states significant discretion in interpreting the Conventions. If anything, the US 
push for flexibility will have the effect of enlarging state discretion, whether it tends 
towards public health-based approaches or the more traditional law-enforcement 
led approach. The reality is that the orthodox, law enforcement first, approach to 
drug control continues to be widely used: UNODC assesses that while criminal 
convictions related to drug trafficking have remained relatively stable over time, 
drug possession offences showed a 13 per cent increase worldwide since 2003.63 
The push for flexibility reflects the fact that, six months out from UNGASS 2016, 
there is no single, coherent view amongst the UN’s 193 Member States about what 
UNGASS 2016 should aim to achieve, or even what will come after UNGASS 2016. 
2
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Instead, as we explain in this section, there are three broad approaches: Scepticism, 
Orthodoxy, and Swing Voting.
scepticism 
As explained above, UNGASS 2016 is the result of an initiative led by some Latin 
American states, reflecting a view that the current, orthodox approach, is not working 
as desired. Other stakeholders that have voiced similar scepticism include some 
Caribbean and European states, as well as some UN bodies (notably UNAIDS, UNDP 
and OHCHR). Activist civil society groups, such as the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy, Drug Policy Alliance and International Drug Policy Consortium, have also 
helped to stoke this scepticism, as have a number of high-profile international media 
outlets who have questioned the War on Drugs and called for its end.64 
The aspirations for UNGASS 2016 of each of these sceptical voices differ, however, 
quite significantly. Some civil society groups, notably the high-profile, private, 24 
member Global Commission on Drug Policy, have actively advocated for treaty 
review and reform, and even consideration of legalization of some currently 
prohibited drugs.65 Few states now openly advocate this agenda – though Jamaica 
and Uruguay have both pushed for its consideration.66 Other Latin American 
countries have, more tentatively, requested that UNGASS initiate a review of 
scheduling arrangements and the mandates of the drug control regime’s organs,67 
and more broadly advocate a change to the tone and tenor of global drug policy 
debates to prioritize a focus on societies and individuals. This has included calls 
for addressing social harms and root causes of the drug trade, community violence 
reduction, reform of incarceration policy, balancing law enforcement with public 
health priorities, and development-based approaches to drug policy.68 We return 
to these specific issues in Part 3 of this paper. Reform-minded European states 
such as The Netherlands and Portugal arguably have an even narrower agenda for 
UNGASS 2016, encouraging a greater focus on public health tools in drug treatment 
and, as a recent European Union (EU) position paper calls for, an affirmation that 
the “guiding principle of drug policies should be scientific evidence and best 
practices.”69 Most African and Asian states support the current supply-reduction 
paradigm, although there are some signs that Senegal may be becoming more 
sceptical,70 perhaps a sign of the influence of the 2014 findings of the West Africa 
Commission on Drugs, a high-level independent expert group similar to the Global 
Commission on Drug Policy. 
Scepticism is also forcefully expressed by some UN entities, increasingly vocal about 
the need to de-conflict the UN’s role in promoting global drug control with its role 
in promoting public health, development and human rights. As we discuss further 
below, UNDP is calling attention to drug policy impacts on human development,71 
while UNAIDS floated the idea that any new political declaration on drug policy 
should contain a fourth pillar focused on public health.72 The Human Rights Council 
(HRC) recently debated a study prepared at its request by OHCHR on the effects of 
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the world drug problem on human rights,73 and the Deputy High Commissioner of 
Human Rights expressed “hope” that the UNGASS outcome document addresses 
human rights “so that… protection of human rights can be better integrated into 
State law and practice”.74 And even the WHO, normally cautious in this area, has 
suggested that the many interpretations of the meaning of “public health” point to a 
need to clarify that concept’s place in the global approach to drug policy.75 
Scepticism alone does not, however, offer a coherent agenda for reform. This is 
the critique that many state representatives privately offer in New York: having 
called a high-profile UN General Assembly Special Session to query the orthodox 
approach to global drug control, they grumble, the sceptics have failed to articulate 
a clear alternative policy agenda. This risks weakening the current system without 
mending it. Instead, they suggest, these issues would be better left for the drug 
control specialists at the CND in Vienna, who follow these issues routinely and 
are better informed about the complex medical, legal, social and political issues 
in play. The sceptics respond with a variation on the French statesman George 
Clemenceau’s quip: “War is too important to be left to the generals”. It is now 
clear, they suggest, that the social impact and significance of drug control make it 
too important a matter to leave to the path-dependent experts sent to CND from 
law enforcement agencies and diplomatic corps, reproducing the drug control 
discourse without accounting for its impacts on public health, development and 
human rights. A Special Session of the General Assembly was needed, they argue, 
precisely to allow a step-back examination of global drug policy, and to ensure 
‘system-wide’ coherence. 
orthodoxy
The absence of a coherent reform agenda heading into UNGASS 2016 and the 
reality of consensus decision-making at the UN inevitably mean that the Outcome 
Document will not deviate very far from the current orthodoxy. Indeed, many states 
see talk of legalization as reckless. As a previous chair of INCB has pointed out, 
liberalization of access to some currently prohibited narcotics would likely have 
some negative impacts on public health, citing alcohol and tobacco markets as 
“cautionary tales”.76 UNODC has also historically championed a law enforcement-
led approach, arguing, controversially, that supply reduction efforts have led 
to long-term decline in supply in some markets.77 Both the current Executive 
Director of UNODC, Yuri Fedotov, and his predecessor, Antonio Maria Costa, have 
however emphasized the need for the international drug control conventions to be 
implemented in a manner that respects human rights, protects public health and 
encourages access to licit livelihoods.78 Yet on the occasions that UNODC, as the 
Secretariat for the global drug control Conventions, has taken issue with elements of 
the orthodox approach to drug policy, this has had little visible effect within CND.
The powerful group of states that are clearly supportive of the orthodox approach 
includes Russia, China, India, Japan, and many Middle Eastern and Asian states. 
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For some Asian states this support for strong supply reduction efforts is rooted 
in the historical experience of armed Western invasion intended to force Asian 
consumers to accept Western-controlled drug supply, as well as their own 
subsequent experiences attempting to stamp out drug production, sometimes 
with apparent – if brutal – success.79 It is also important to recognize that, unlike 
their Latin America counterparts, some Asian states today witness large drug 
flows and consumption without suffering high levels of overt, widespread violence 
(although some, such as Afghanistan and Myanmar, do). From this perspective, 
drug trafficking, if properly controlled by the state, does not necessarily lead to 
the social violence witnessed in the Western Hemisphere.80 The rise of the middle 
class across Asia has nonetheless stoked concern about rising drug consumption 
and abuse, leading some governments, such as China, to crack down in an effort 
at deterrence, despite international expressions of concern.81 Iran is believed to be 
executing five times the number of drug smugglers it did a few years ago, and Russia 
is reportedly exploring agreements with neighbouring countries to ban methadone.82 
swing voting
Most states are not deeply ideologically committed to a law enforcement-based 
approach to drug policy. They are, at least in theory, Swing Voters, open to 
persuasion. It is conceivable that these states’ positions on drug policy could 
change, but it would require the clear articulation of a new policy agenda, with 
clear pay-offs that could at least offset their losses from defecting from the 
orthodoxy. Almost fifty years of the ‘War on Drugs’ has created strong policy inertia. 
A powerful network of vested institutional interests at the national level supports 
continuing the current approach to drug policy. In some fragile states, foreign 
financial, technical and political support, framed in terms of drug control objectives, 
plays an important part in controlling militaries, organizing patronage, and regime 
security strategies.83 
Still, the evolution of the position of the United States may change the equation as 
other states begin to query whether defection from the ‘War on Drugs’ orthodoxy 
still carries the same costs, namely the withholding of US military or financial support. 
Some commentators suggest that other states, notably Russia and China, may 
yet step into the role of ‘Drug Warriors’, enforcing the orthodoxy, and stepping 
up financial support to international drug control programming.84 Domestically, 
cracking down on drug use – and especially drug smuggling – remains good politics 
in many countries; stigmatization of drug traffickers and users is an important part 
of the narrative that many governments use to persuade their citizens that they are 
protectors of the community. 
Hardly any Swing Voters seem likely to dramatically change their position in the next 
six months, however, because there is no serious pressure from their publics, nor 
from key bilateral partners, for change. It is conceivable, however, that they could 
change their position over the next few years – for example ahead of the renewal of 
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the Political Declaration and Plan of Action in 2019. For example, there are arguably 
significant development pay-offs (including public health benefits) to be gained from 
a more balanced approach to drug control. But for this pro-development drug policy 
agenda to emerge and persuade the Swing Voters, they will have to be involved in the 
global drug control discussion. 140 UN Member States – many of them Swing Voters 
– are not routinely involved in that debate, because it takes place at the 53-Member 
CND in Vienna. Moreover, sceptics will have to explain in much more concrete – i.e. 
dollar – terms what the pay-offs from drug policy reform will be. As more concrete 
evidence emerges from Western Hemisphere, European, and perhaps some African 
experiments about the costs or benefits of different policy reforms – which might 
include changes in areas as diverse and complex as tax revenue, public health 
burdens and expenditure, criminal justice expenditure and rates of violence – the case 
for reform may become more convincing, and the positions of Swing Voters more 
salient to determining global drug policy. For now, however – and at UNGASS 2016 – 
they will remain a silent majority. 
what will the outcome be? 
The trend heading into UNGASS 2016 is clear: in the absence of a clearly articulated 
reform agenda with obvious pay-offs for states who muster the courage to defect 
from the orthodoxy, Member States will largely coalesce around an affirmation 
of the existing regime, coupled with a call for flexibility in implementation 
of that regime. Some small rhetorical adjustments in favour of states giving 
greater attention to public health and human rights in their own implementation 
efforts will be thrown in for good measure. So much is apparent from the 
negotiations to date.85 
This outcome will not be without risks. There is a danger that flexibility will lead 
to policy fragmentation, because in practice flexibility will mean very different 
things in different parts of the world, pulling a notionally global regulatory system 
in almost opposite directions in different regions. In the Americas and parts of 
Europe (and Australasia), flexibility will give a green light to states, provinces and 
municipalities trying out more permissive, if regulated, approaches to cannabis, as 
well as experimentation with public health based treatment of users and offenders. 
In Asia and parts of Africa, by contrast, flexibility will be seen as a validation of 
deterrence-oriented approaches based on law enforcement crackdowns, draconian 
sentences and a reliance on coercive rehabilitation methodologies. As INCB has 
pointed out, the challenge is to ensure that experimentation does not “undermine 
the principle of common and shared responsibility”.86 If flexibility slides into 
fragmentation, both policy and operational coordination will suffer – and the 
costs of coordination will rise. Drug reformers such as the Transnational Institute 
also point to the broader harms that might be caused by normalizing breaches 
of the drug control conventions: acquiescing in breaches of one convention 
may undermine the legitimacy of global governance more generally.87 
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The key to avoiding this outcome – fragmentation – is to ensure that flexibility is 
not treated as a code-word for unprincipled laissez faire, but instead is embedded 
in a process of collective policy development, based on a more detailed and 
holistic analysis of what works. The result of such an approach could be a more 
pluralistic system than the War on Drugs has allowed, giving states greater flexibility 
in their choices about the mixture of policy tools that will best suit their national 
circumstances. But if it is to be globally legitimate and effective, it must also be a 
system that ensures that national policy choices are guided by three common central 
principles: 1) respect for human rights; 2) promotion of human development; and 3) 
guidance by the best available scientific evidence. In Part 3, we explore four specific 
issue areas that UNGASS 2016 will consider, and identify common ground in each area 
that we believe will allow the emergence of such a discussion and, in time, this kind of 
principled pluralism. In Part 4, we offer a suggestion for an organizational framework 
for that discussion between UNGASS 2016 and 2019. 
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Is there any common ground?
penal policy
Criminal justice and law enforcement-based approaches have been at the centre 
of global drugs policy for many decades, particularly since the 1988 Convention 
criminalized the illicit drug trade. The 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action 
incorporates an entire pillar focused on criminal justice efforts, including encouraging 
judicial cooperation and promoting anti-money-laundering.88 In recent years, however, 
there has been a growing push to rethink policing strategies89 and penal policy: how 
criminal justice systems handle drug offences, particularly the heavy reliance in some 
jurisdictions on incarceration of drug users and the use of the death penalty to deal 
with traffickers. While policing issues will certainly be discussed at UNGASS 2016, we 
see particular prospects for common ground on penal policy.
The 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action itself notes that there are 
“alternatives to prosecution and imprisonment for drug-using offenders” such as 
drug dependence treatment, and calls attention to the need to address corruption 
and over-crowding in prisons, commit to programming for re-entry and social 
reintegration, and provide adequate training to staff.90 The Chair of the INCB recently 
made clear that the Conventions do not require incarceration for drug use, and 
emphasized the importance of proportionality between an offense and the sentence 
it attracts. INCB has likewise emphasized the importance of a “balanced approach 
in which prevention, treatment and rehabilitation”, and not only deterrence and 
punishment, “take a leading role”.91 In 2011, a UNODC Justice Section paper stated 
that it is “internationally recognised that where possible drug users should receive 
treatment rather than imprisonment”.92 In 2015 UNODC’s HIV/AIDS team appears 
to have prepared a draft briefing paper – never formally approved or released by 
3
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UNODC – stating that decriminalization of drug use and possession is permissible 
under the Conventions and “may be required to meet obligations under international 
human rights law”.93 Even more clearly, WHO has stated that “countries should 
work toward developing policies and laws that decriminalize injection and other use 
of drugs and, thereby, reduce incarceration,” and ban compulsory treatment for 
people who use drugs.94
Questions relating to penal policy – the role of capital, custodial and other forms of 
punishment – are central to this debate. The expansion of the debate has accelerated 
as scepticism about the current approach to penal policy has become mainstreamed 
in American politics, with both Democrat and Republican leaders now calling for 
reform. The drivers for this public policy shift include fiscal, public health and broader 
social considerations. In 2014, nearly 14 per cent of all arrests in the US were drug-
related, with 83 per cent of those arrests being for possession.95 And with 48 per cent 
of the United States federal prison population incarcerated on drug-related offences96 
in 2013, one-third of the Justice Department’s budget went to the Bureau of Prisons.97 
Resulting prison-overcrowding can reduce inmates’ access to services, and may 
increase opportunities for violence and abuse.98 WHO has argued that excessive 
reliance on penal tools can reduce even un-imprisoned user populations’ access to 
healthcare services.99 This may increase the public health burdens countries face, with 
particularly negative developmental consequences. 
The shift in the US position has opened up space at the international level for a 
rethink of the role of penal policy in global drug policy. For instance, the Obama 
Administration’s acknowledgment of “demographic disparities” in the application 
of drug control laws100 reflects a trend to acknowledge similar disparities elsewhere. 
(States in West Africa, for example, have arguably felt the effects of a penal policy 
focused on small-scale dealers, users and couriers rather than high-level, or politically 
connected, participants in the drug trade.101) The resulting American evolution from 
the lead ‘Drug Warrior’ pushing punishment and deterrence-based approaches, 
through both bilateral and multilateral channels, to a position advocating a more 
balanced or flexible approach, has created the space for policy reflection in other 
states that American pressure previously denied them.102 Nor is the US stance merely 
passive: earlier this year, CND adopted a resolution originally submitted by the 
United States, which calls for states to consider alternatives to incarceration for drug-
related offences of a minor nature, promote collaboration between health and justice 
departments, and promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.103 
Parts of the US are beginning to more closely resemble European jurisdictions that 
have rethought the role of domestic penal policy in drug control, experimenting 
with decriminalization of minor drug possession offences and drug use. Some states 
are diverting drug users into non-custodial intervention programmes encompassing 
medical, psychological, social service, employment and training, and other types of 
support and rehabilitation. In many cases, for example in Finland and Switzerland’s 
programming, custodial and non-custodial interventions are treated not as mutually 
exclusive alternatives, but as different – and complementary – regulatory tools to 
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be carefully combined and balanced.104 Support for reforming penal policy seems 
strongest around questions of sentencing proportionality for non-violent, minor drug 
offences.105 Countries as diverse as Ecuador, England and Wales, and Singapore 
have all recently reduced the penalties imposed on low-level drug couriers and 
traffickers.106 The African Union 2013 Plan of Action calls on its Member States 
to institutionalize diversion programmes for people who use drugs, especially 
alternatives to incarceration for minor offenses, as does a draft Common African 
Position on UNGASS.107 The EU’s 2013-2016 Action Plan on Drugs goes further, 
incorporating a goal of having all Member States providing alternatives to coercive 
sanctions for drug use offences by 2015.108 Italy is debating legislation that would 
legalize cultivation, distribution, and consumption of cannabis,109 and local and county 
police forces in parts of the United Kingdom have declared they will stop arresting 
people for personal consumption and/or small-scale cultivation of cannabis.110 Some 
Latin American and Caribbean states are adopting limited decriminalization policies,111 
and the OAS is encouraging its members to promote alternatives to incarceration.112 
A number of Western, Latin American and Caribbean states, including Australia, 
Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and the US, have also been experimenting with so-called 
‘drug courts’: specialized judicial bodies that mandate court-supervised treatment 
programmes.113 (These are not without critique, however, in particular relating to 
whether judicial or medical expertise drive the courts’ treatment decisions.)114 And the 
US is pushing for the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document to support “alternatives to 
incarceration and other criminal justice reform for drug-related offenses”.115 
Yet some states believe that questions of penal policy – including the use of the death 
penalty – are internal matters, not appropriately discussed in international forums. 
China stands out in this regard, explicitly arguing that any discussion of weakening 
a state’s ability to “freely determine appropriate punishment” for drug offenses 
during UNGASS 2016 would not be appropriate.116 The polarization is strongest 
around the question of whether capital punishment is ever appropriate in non-violent 
drug-related offences. EU states have described the abolition of the death penalty 
in drug-related cases as an absolute priority.117But as of 2012, 33 countries retained 
capital punishment laws for drug offences, though such sentences seem more often 
to be applied to foreign nationals than to a country’s own nationals.118 Iran claims 80 
per cent of its death-row prisoners are there on drug-related charges, and many of 
them are foreign nationals – especially Afghans.119 Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as 
China, have recently executed foreign nationals for drug-related offenses.120 The UN, 
including UNODC, officially stands against the application and implementation of the 
death penalty in drug related offences.121 OHCHR, the UN Human Rights Committee 
(that interprets the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and several 
UN human rights special procedure mandate-holders have indicated that it is never 
valid to apply the death penalty in drug-related offenses.122 Former INCB President 
Lochan Naidoo has stated that Member States retaining the death penalty for drug-
related offences should consider abolishing it.123 Yet this international opposition has 
not deterred some states: for example, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s recent 
appeals to Indonesia to commute the death sentences of nine individuals convicted of 
drug trafficking were not successful.124 
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While a wide array of states – including China – recognize the relevance of the 
principle of proportionality in determining the sentences of drug offences,125 the 
lack of consensus about the social, developmental and other impacts of drugs 
– and the policies that aim to control them – undermines the development of a 
consensus interpretation of what proportionality means in practice. How can the 
proportionality of the harm imposed on an offender by a particular punishment 
be assessed, if it is not agreed what social harms or benefits it is being compared 
to – because there is little agreement about the broader social, economic and 
developmental harms caused by different drugs or drug control policies in the first 
place? While we can expect the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document to emphasize 
the importance of respect for proportionality, human rights and the rule of law, this 
will in large part be because of the creative ambiguity these broad terms offer. The 
consensus language will mask disagreement over implementation. Agreement on 
specific approaches to pursuing these broad objectives – such as decriminalization, 
alternatives to incarceration, or non-application of the death penalty – will be 
much harder to achieve. 
It is not however impossible. The key is to see UNGASS 2016 not as a do-or-die 
moment when such agreements must be finalized, but as an opportunity to start a 
more robust, structured discussion about what science tells us the costs and benefits 
of different drug control polices are – a discussion of what works. States can use 
UNGASS 2016 to initiate a conversation that allows them, on the basis of the latest 
and best available scientific evidence, to understand what kinds of penal policy 
outcomes are feasible and likely under different circumstances, reflect on how good 
practice can help contribute to stronger development outcomes, and dynamically 
update international guidance as this learning evolves and strengthens. A US 
contribution to UNGASS 2016 has suggested, along these lines, that UNGASS should 
“encourage” states “launching pilot programs, research initiatives, and exchange of 
information on best practices in order to accelerate criminal justice reforms under the 
framework of the drug conventions”.126 
We argue that a more centralized, but temporary, forum is required to accelerate 
the development and sharing of learning, and its incorporation into common policy 
positions, ahead of the renewal of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action in 
2019. This should involve states, relevant UN agencies and independent experts 
sharing evidence about the outcomes of different penal policy interventions.127 This 
conversation needs to take place outside the confines of CND, which too many 
states see as unrepresentative and beholden to a drug control discourse that fails 
to generate coherence with the UN’s other public policy objectives, such as the 
promotion of peace and security, development and human rights.128 In Part 4, we 
argue for the creation of a new, temporary forum – an Open Working Group on Drug 
Policy – to allow a broader discussion of a more coherent global drug policy between 
2016 and 2019, and work towards a set of Global Drug Control Goals. 
Regardless of whether it occurs in this forum or elsewhere, states should encourage 
and accelerate the sharing of evidence about penal policy impacts and outcomes. 
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This will stimulate and help to mobilize resources for South-South and triangular 
collaboration,129 and could even lead to pilot programmes to explore promising new 
penal policy interventions. Collaboration to strengthen the evidence base around 
the impacts of such interventions might allow states – and other stakeholders – to 
work towards a common understanding of the benefits and harms of different penal 
policies, and perhaps even to begin to coalesce around common goals. Traditional 
drug control metrics such as arrest quotas and conviction rates have tended to 
incentivize incarceration, and may encourage law enforcement actors to go after the 
easiest targets, such as street-level dealers, mules, or people who use drugs.130 As we 
explore further in Part 4, new metrics that provide a more holistic understanding of 
the impacts of these policies may need to be developed. 
Recommendation 1 – Penal Policy
Accelerate evidence sharing on drug control 
penal policy outcomes
UNGASS 2016 should create a forum to encourage states, international 
organizations, academics and civil society to share robust scientific evidence about 
a wide range of drug control penal policy interventions and their outcomes. This 
forum could provide a platform for South-South and triangular cooperation, and 
encourage the development of a stronger evidence base on penal policy ahead of 
the adoption of a new Political Declaration and Plan of Action in 2019.
public health 
The promotion of the “health and welfare of mankind” is the central policy objective 
of the entire international drug control regime, as the three major drug control 
conventions make clear, and as the INCB has repeatedly reiterated.131 There is broad 
consensus among Member States around the importance of a focus on public health 
in drug policy.132 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said that the UN “must” 
consider alternatives to incarceration for people who use drugs and “increase the 
focus on public health, prevention, treatment and care, as well as on economic, 
social and cultural strategies”.133 UNAIDS officials have even floated the idea that 
the international community recognize public health as a pillar of global drug policy, 
alongside supply and demand reduction, and international criminal cooperation.134 
And since the adoption of the 2009 Political Declaration, states have routinely 
reiterated the need for a “balanced and integrated” approach to drug policy – i.e., 
balancing law enforcement with public health. 
Yet significant tensions have emerged in recent years not only over what that 
“balance” means in practice, but also over the weight that states should afford to 
medical and public health expertise in deciding how to control specific substances. 
When earlier this year China moved to have ketamine globally prohibited, the WHO’s 
ECDD recommended against it, partly because of the use of ketamine in maternal 
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and palliative care. The Secretariat of CND then sought advice from the UN Office 
of Legal Affairs (OLA) on CND’s scope for scheduling a substance despite the ECDD 
recommending against it. OLA’s advice argued that CND is not bound by ECDD 
recommendations. While China decided not to pursue the issue for now, the EU has 
subsequently proposed that UNGASS 2016 direct CND to give priority to ECDD 
scheduling recommendations.135 Cannabis may be the next battleground, with the 
ECDD expected to review its scheduling, paying special attention to toxicity and 
adverse reactions, abuse and dependence potential, medical use and controls and 
their impact, in a review commencing in November 2015.136 
This also connects to a larger discussion concerning whether the current system 
is ensuring adequate supply of controlled medicines.137 In 2014, the INCB 
noted that some 5.5 billion people are without adequate access to “medicines 
containing narcotic drugs”,138 suggesting a potentially enormous gap in Convention 
implementation, with significant public health and development implications, 
as reflected in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 of the new 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development.139 WHO runs an Access to Controlled Medications 
Programme (ACMP) in consultation with INCB, offering states normative guidance, 
policy analysis, training and practical assistance.140 But with a proposed budget 
of around USD 55.5 million over 6 years, this effort is dwarfed by the problem.141 
Uruguay has asked that UNGASS ensure adequate funding for WHO and UNODC 
programming in this area, while the US has proposed that INCB take a bigger 
role.142 In March 2015 then-INCB President Dr. Naidoo proposed that governments 
perform national level diagnostics regarding access to medicine.143 But the scale and 
complexity of the problem suggest a much deeper review of the situation is needed 
to overcome this collective action problem. Our recommendation suggests UNGASS 
2016 initiate a process to provide an objective, evidence-based analysis of the 
situation – and opportunities – in this area:
Recommendation 2 – Access to Controlled Medicines
Establish a High-Level Independent Commission on access to 
controlled medicines
UNGASS 2016 should establish a high-level, independent expert commission, 
supported by WHO, to analyse global access to controlled medicines and report 
back to the General Assembly or ECOSOC, via the UN Secretary-General, on 
measures to improve it. 
It is not only access to controlled medicines, however, but also access for those 
with drug use disorders to effective treatment that will be raised at UNGASS 2016. 
UNODC’s 2014 World Drug Report finds that while one in five “problem drug 
users” receives treatment in Western Europe, only approximately one in 18 receives 
treatment in Africa.144 In West Africa, the West Africa Commission on Drugs found that 
inadequate funding of treatment facilities and lack of skilled personnel derives from 
WHAT COMES AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS – FLEXIBILITY, FRAGMENTATION OR PRINCIPLED PLURALISM?23
INTRODUCTION   |   CHAPTER 1   |   CHAPTER 2   |   CHAPTER 3   |   CHAPTER 4   |   CONCLUSION
a “glaring absence of drug treatment policies, standards and monitoring systems” 
and a lack of public expenditure due to the stigmatization of drug dependence.145 
In other countries where treatment for drug dependence is available, often as the 
result of tireless action by private actors, there are widely differing views of what that 
treatment should involve. Some 90 states ranging from Iran to Switzerland, and from 
Morocco to Malaysia, now implement some range of harm reduction measures for 
drug users,146 and this approach is spreading steadily, including to Africa. Tanzania’s 
Ambassador to the UN recently remarked that its methadone program needed to be 
“scale[d] up in a gradual, sustainable way.”147 Still, obstacles persist. In many countries, 
the focus is on abstinence-based 
treatment rather than best practice 
harm reduction measures in 
treating drug use disorders.148 
What is more, some states are 
increasingly pushing back against 
some of these measures, such 
as the use of methadone. Russia 
may challenge opioid substitution 
therapy at UNGASS 2016,149 and 
it has recently questioned WHO’s 
classification of methadone as 
an essential medicine.150 (WHO’s 
position receives support, inter alia, 
from INCB.151) Russian delegates 
have even argued that the term 
‘harm reduction’ has no place in 
international debates, since it has 
yet to be approved by an intergovernmental body in this context.152 Other states 
feel very differently: at the adoption of the 2009 Political Declaration, 26 countries 
delivered an interpretive statement saying they would interpret it to permit harm 
reduction, despite the removal of that term during the drafting process.153 The 
General Assembly itself used the term in the 2011 Political Declaration on HIV and 
AIDS, encouraging states to consider implementing and expanding harm-reduction 
programmes.154 UN Agencies, including WHO, UNODC and UNAIDS all explicitly 
reference harm reduction services.155 
The debate is not purely semantic, but goes to the central question of what forms 
of treatment work in treating drug use and dependence, and thus how national 
discretion in implementing the Conventions should be exercised. Some current 
treatments for drug use disorders raise serious human rights concerns relating to 
involuntary detention, lack of due process, forced labour and corporal punishment, 
sexual abuse and abuse of medical ethics.156 UNODC and several Member States 
are currently developing standards and guidance on drug dependence treatment, 
and some of these ideas seem likely to find their way to CND, perhaps even ahead 
of UNGASS 2016.157 WHO is also active in the area, and various UN programming 
guidance documents aim to help Member States deliver public health programming 
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to deal with drug use and dependence.158 Yet these documents and standards are 
not binding on states, and are unlikely to become so, given the large differences 
between different groups of states (and other stakeholders) over drug treatment 
and rehabilitation methodologies. Nor do they reflect a consistent approach 
across the UN system. 
An alternative approach would be to create more space for innovation with different 
forms of treatment, based on respect for two fundamental principles: 1) they are 
driven by science, and 2) they respect human rights. It may take some time for 
this debate to find common ground among Member States; in Part 4 we make a 
recommendation for how such a discussion could be promoted. In the short term, 
however, a first step in this direction is within reach, in the context of the push by 
several UN entities for greater ‘system-wide coherence’. A pathway within the UN is 
needed to advance this discussion as a way of strengthening the uptake of existing 
UN guidance on drug disorder treatment, and to encourage convergence by states 
towards best practice treatment practices. UNGASS 2016 could request the UN 
Secretary-General to develop a common approach to drug treatment, to guide all 
UN system activities in this area. Importantly, the development of such guidance 
should not be limited to entities such as UNODC, UNAIDS and WHO, but should 
also encompass input from UNDP, OHCHR and DPA (as co-chairs of the UN System 
Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking). The aim should 
be to generate system-wide coherence, integrating UN support to Member States’ 
drug treatment efforts with broader development, human rights and peace and 
stability objectives.
Recommendation 3 – Drug Dependence Treatment
Develop UN-wide guidance on treatment of drug use disorders
UNGASS 2016 should request the Secretary-General to develop coherent,  
UN-system-wide guidance on treatment of drug use disorders, for application 
across UN programming contexts. 
development
The War on Drugs was predicated on the idea that drugs are produced in and 
supplied by developing countries, then trafficked to developed countries, where 
they are consumed. Accordingly, strong – even militarized – interdiction and supply 
reduction efforts in developing countries were thought to be capable of preventing 
drugs reaching consumers.159 Such thinking is arguably out-dated in three ways. 
First, it arguably fails to reflect what is now understood about the impacts on 
development not only of illicit drug markets, but also repressive policies to control 
them. That recognition is reflected in SDG 3.5 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, in which the UN General Assembly recognized the relevance to 
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development outcomes of narcotic drug abuse policies.160 The illicit drug trade can 
distort local economies, skewing investment away from the legitimate economy 
towards illicit economic activity, creating a ‘crime trap’ similar to the ‘conflict trap’ 
identified by the World Bank fifteen years ago.161 But militarized and law enforcement-
led responses to such markets can also have a number of negative effects on 
development, both through direct physical harm and resulting loss of productivity, 
and through the creation of externalities such as lost tax revenue, high public 
health burdens, high criminal justice system costs and, perhaps most significant, 
corruption.162 Illicit crop cultivation is often linked to conditions of poverty, and 
growers can face violence and repression from the state as well as from actors in 
the drug trade.163 Criminalization and stigmatization of communities affected by 
drug trafficking tends to reinforce structural barriers to economic development.164 
Budgetary allocations for punitive drug policies divert funds from other goals.165 
And heavy-handed approaches to drug control can generate significant unexpected 
environmental externalities.166
Second, the description of the world as neatly split between developing country 
drug producers and developed country drug consumers is simply no longer 
accurate. The lines between supplier, transit and consumer states are now 
seriously blurred.167 Cannabis, ATS and NPS are increasingly grown and produced 
worldwide.168 Canada, for example, is now one of the top exporters of both ecstasy 
and methamphetamine.169 And traditional producer and transit countries are hosts to 
increasingly high levels of consumption.170 
Third, the understanding of the connections between drug policy and development 
demonstrated by global drug control policymakers has not kept up with evolutions 
in development thinking. Drug control policy choices will impact several aspects 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, not only SDG 3.5 (substance 
abuse treatment), but also SDG 1 (End Poverty), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and 
Settlements), SDG 16 (Peace and Justice, Strong Institutions).171 In adopting this 
agenda, UN Member States have already signalled their acceptance of sustainable 
development as a universal policy agenda, suggesting a willingness to move 
past rigid developed v. developing country thinking. Some countries are ready 
to revisit global drug control policy, precisely because they recognize that new 
approaches might unlock new development resources. The President of the 69th 
General Assembly, H.E. Mr Samuel Kutesa, previously Foreign Minister of Uganda, 
has argued that “resources directed at [the world drug] problem could have been 
more effectively utilised for development.”172 Egypt has stated that UNGASS 2016 
should discuss the root causes of the drug problem, “with special attention to Africa 
in achieving sustainable development and social inclusion”.173 And the Moroccan 
government has held legislative hearings to discuss possible medical and industrial 
uses of its expansive marijuana crop, apparently with a view to unlocking tax revenues 
and export income.174
Rather than recognizing the potential development gains to be garnered from more 
effective drug policies, however, global drug policy continues to treat development 
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as window-dressing, an afterthought tacked on to coercive supply reduction 
programming in the form of alternative development projects. Such programming 
aims to provide replacement livelihoods and other forms of development support 
to communities displaced from illicit drug crop production by supply reduction 
measures. Alternative development is championed by states such as Germany, 
Thailand, and Peru, among others, and has widespread appeal among UN Member 
States, including the Group of 77 and China.175 But major obstacles exist to 
effective, well-monitored implementation.176 In 2013, the General Assembly 
adopted new UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development. Yet current 
alternative development thinking continues to reflect the out-dated thinking 
about the economic geography of drug markets. It treats alternative development 
as a question for rural, agricultural communities, when evidence shows that the 
communities affected by contemporary drug markets also include urban producer 
and trafficking communities.177 If alternative development programming is to move 
from being a tool of charitable giving to a strategic tool driving pro-development 
community transformation, this conceptual and contextual expansion will need 
rapid acceleration. 
A new approach would recognize that development must be a central, not marginal, 
concern of drug policy choices at the global level, and that a pro-development 
perspective must be integrated across drug control programming. Some states 
have signalled interest exploring this possibility, highlighting in official statements 
that there are structural drivers of illicit crop cultivation, including poverty, weak 
government presence, and access to land; and calling for drug policies to consider 
how infrastructure improvements, expenditures on health, education, and access to 
markets and water might improve the prospects of communities participating in licit 
economies.178 The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) has 
officially requested that UNGASS consider community-based development projects 
as a way to reduce involvement in illicit drug-related activity.179 
But in order for development considerations to be more fully integrated into global 
drug policy choices, states will need to reflect on their development impacts at 
the human, household, national and global levels. UNDP has made a powerful 
case for just such an approach in its 2015 report, Addressing the Development 
Dimensions of Drug Policy, in which it argues that the well established concept of 
human development provides a framework for understanding – and, importantly, 
measuring – the impacts of drugs and drug control policies.180 Given the high 
level of acceptance of the human development concept and the strong body of 
science around the concept, this may offer important new common ground for 
further state discussion.
This will also, however, require the development of new ways of measuring the 
human development impact of drugs and drug policy. Fortunately, a discussion of 
metrics has already been initiated by the adoption of SDG 3.5. An Inter-agency and 
Expert Group on these goals (IAEG-SDGs) is currently working on the formulation 
of two indicators to help Member States measure progress towards SDG 3.5. Those 
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indicators will be formally approved in March 2016, just prior to UNGASS 2016, by 
the UN Statistical Commission, a body of 28 official statistical experts from Member 
States. At present, the two proposed indicators under consideration are: 1) coverage 
of opioid substitution therapy among opioid-dependent drug users; and 2) coverage 
of interventions for the prevention of substance abuse among people under 25.181 
Both indicators will be helpful; neither, however, measures the impacts of drugs or 
drug policy on populations, but rather measure state interventions. Further metrics 
will, in time, be needed to help Member States understand the development impacts 
of drugs and drug control policies. Some of the ideas proposed to date include 
indicators related to access to controlled medicines; drug-related overdose deaths; 
infection rates for HIV, hepatitis B and C among people who use drugs; number 
of people held in compulsory addiction treatment centres; levels of social and 
economic development in communities where drug production, consumption or sale 
is concentrated; and number of victims of drug-related violence.182
A wider discussion is therefore needed, within the context of the UN Statistical 
Commission, to help Member States develop the data they need before 2019 to 
have a more informed discussion about drug policy outcomes and options, and 
their impacts on human development. We offer an operational recommendation for 
moving this discussion forward:
Recommendation 4 – Human Development and Drug Control Metrics
Build new pro-development metrics to help prepare the next 
Political Declaration
Building on current discussions on drug control indicators for SDG 3.5 in the 
IAEG-SDGs and the UN Statistical Commission, UNGASS 2016 should call on 
the UN Statistical Commission to initiate a formal workstream to develop new 
metrics measuring the human development impacts of drugs and drug control 
policies. If possible, such data should begin to be collected by national statistical 
agencies ahead of 2019, to inform the preparation of a new Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action. 
human rights
While the three existing drug control Conventions do not specifically reference 
human rights, it is clear that states are obliged to read the Conventions in 
light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to implement their 
Convention obligations in ways that respect human rights. This is recognized in 
the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action,183 and in other products of CND 
and UNODC.184 Several Member States and regional groups, including the US, 
United Kingdom, the EU, CELAC, and Uruguay, have requested that the UNGASS 
2016 Outcome Document make clear that drug policy implementation needs to 
be consistent with human rights.185 But some feel that existing approaches pay 
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inadequate attention to human rights concerns. Human Rights Watch has queried 
the extent to which human rights considerations guide UN programming.186 Uruguay 
has asked that a technical group be established within the UN Human Rights Council 
framework to draft guidelines for states and conduct country reports to “ensure 
compliance” with human rights standards.187 And EU states are pushing for the 
UNGASS Outcome Document to recognize the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, along with the 3 Conventions, as a “cornerstone” of global drug policy.188 
The Human Rights Council recently tasked the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights with preparing a report on the impacts on human rights caused by the 
world drug problem. That report details how some drug policy choices negatively 
impact human rights in the areas of penal policy, protection of children, indigenous 
people’s rights, and non-discrimination. The report recommends consideration of 
decriminalizing “personal use and possession” of drugs in order to protect the right 
to health, and consideration of alternatives to incarceration for minor, non-violent 
offences, reform of laws that unduly target marginalized groups, and the cessation of 
the death penalty for drug-related offences.189 
The elevation of human rights considerations within drug policy will not, however, go 
unopposed. As with matters of penal policy, some states see discussion of human 
rights as beyond the purview of the global drug control institutions. In 2008, when 
the CND first passed a resolution on human rights, China and Japan both objected to 
the idea that CND should reference human rights standards.190 As with questions of 
drug treatment, it may take a sustained discussion for states to find common ground 
on these questions. States can help this debate mature by raising questions about the 
consonance of national drug control policies with a state’s human rights obligations 
through the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process. But as with 
questions of drug treatment, it may be that a more feasible initial step could occur 
within the UN inter-agency process. Given these political realities, we suggest that 
UNGASS 2016 focuses its efforts in this area on encouraging system-wide coherence 
within the UN system:
Recommendation 5 – Human Rights
Develop UN-wide guidance on protection of human rights  
in drug programming
UNGASS 2016 should request the Secretary-General to task the UN System Task 
Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking to develop a system-
wide policy on protection of human rights in drug-related programming. This should 
operationalize, and build upon, the existing UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. 
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How can UNGASS 2016 strengthen 
international drug policy?
UNGASS 2016 will not resolve the controversies around penal policy, public health, 
development and human rights in global drug policy. But if used wisely, it could 
strengthen the global drug policy conversation, and create a process based on 
principled pluralism that leads to a more effective global drug policy for adoption 
in 2019, when the current Political Declaration and Plan of Action expires. In Part 3 
we laid out five specific recommendations for steps that Member States could take 
at UNGASS 2016 to help generate such a conversation. In this Part, we reflect on 
how such a conversation might be organized and structured, and make a final, sixth 
recommendation for action by Member States at UNGASS 2016.
organizing principles
Such a drug policy conversation should have four characteristics. 
First, it should be inclusive. Global public policy processes that exclude key 
stakeholders, such as civil society, are unlikely to be legitimate, and therefore 
unlikely to be effective. For that reason, the global drug policy conversation between 
UNGASS 2016 and the renewal of the UN Political Declaration and Plan of Action 
should not aim to create a one-size-fits-all policy discourse to replace the ‘War on 
Drugs’, but rather be based on national-level flexibility coupled with agreed global 
principles – or, as we put it earlier, principled pluralism. The discussion should not 
be wholly owned by CND, but accessible to a broader group of Member States 
and stakeholders. Whether it is justified or not, too many stakeholders see the 
4
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53-member CND as failing to represent the full array of UN Member State opinions, 
and reproducing a global drug policy orthodoxy that does not provide adequate 
flexibility. This is the very reason UNGASS 2016 was called, outside CND, in the first 
place. Notwithstanding the location of CND and UNODC in Vienna, consultations 
on global drug policy between UNGASS 2016 and 2019 should continue to take 
place in New York: all states that participate in CND, and UNODC, are represented 
in New York; but around half of all UN Member States are not represented in Vienna 
on a year-round basis. Civil society representation may also be strengthened by 
conducting these discussions in New York, given the larger presence of public health, 
human rights and development-oriented groups there than in Vienna. This can only 
make the outcome more legitimate. 
Second, this discussion must be driven by science. A wide cross-section of states, 
with very different perspectives on drug policy, has recognized the centrality of 
science for effective policy-making in this area. The EU has called for UNGASS 
2016 to recognize that the “guiding principle of drug policies should be scientific 
evidence and best practices supported by reliable and objective monitoring and 
evaluation systems”.191 The US has asked that UNGASS highlight a “need to invest 
in comprehensive evidence-based … initiatives… [and] scientific research”.192 
And in early 2015 Russia submitted a resolution to CND signalling support for 
scientific research on what works in supply and demand reduction.193 The discussion 
should therefore be organized in a way that affords significant space for direct 
participation by qualified scientific and medical experts. Below, we discuss some 
relevant UN precedents.
Third, this discussion should be explicitly pro-development. As we discussed in 
Part 3 of this policy report, there is now universal recognition at the UN that drug 
control policy and development policy are intertwined, as reflected in SDG 3.5. A 
central aim of this discussion must be to identify how global drug policy can unlock 
new resources for development, both by reducing the negative development 
impacts of existing policies, and by exploring potential new sources of revenue. 
And fourth, for the reasons set out in Part 3, this discussion must protect human rights. 
structuring the discussion
So what would such a conversation look like? 
There have been two other UN General Assembly Special Sessions on drug policy 
before the one coming up in 2016 – in 1990 and 1998. In each case, an expert 
panel was created to provide input to the UN Secretary-General. The first led to 
the creation of a streamlined UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP).194 The second 
likewise focused on the UN mechanics of the drug control system, rather than the 
overall policy approach.195 Both panels were primarily focused on improving the 
functioning of the UN drug control system through administrative, primarily structural, 
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reform – merging bureaus, assessing financial structures, and streamlining committee 
procedures. They were not designed to allow for inclusive, science-driven debate 
about drug policy more broadly. Though instructive, they consequently provide no 
real guidance on how such a debate could be organized. Three other recent global 
public policy discussions may, however, provide more useful inspiration: 1) the process 
that led to the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals; 2) a WHO-led 
process on Non-Communicable Diseases; and 3) the Inter-governmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC).
The process leading to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and its SDGs has been a model of inclusiveness. In 2012, the General 
Assembly created a highly innovative Open Working Group (OWG) sitting in New 
York, using a unique system in which three Member States from the same regional 
political bloc would share one chair, and involving very extensive consultation with 
scientists and civil society. The OWG drew input from a huge variety of sources, 
including thematic clusters (producing position papers on specific issues), a UN 
inter-agency Technical Support Team, Major [issue] Groups, academia and civil 
society – and of course states themselves.196 Through a year-long process, the 
OWG developed the language that became the 17 SDGs and 169 targets. While 
some argue that the inclusiveness of this process came at the expense of precision 
in the resulting document, a technical scrubbing process and the formulation 
of precise scientific indicators for the implementation of the SDGs, carried out 
with the assistance of the UN Statistical Commission, are likely to mitigate this 
concern over time.197 
The WHO-led process on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) is also instructive. In 
2011, an UNGASS on this topic generated a Political Declaration that called for the 
WHO to lead a process to develop a “comprehensive global monitoring framework, 
including a set of indicators, capable of application across regional and country 
settings, including through multisectoral approaches, to monitor trends and to 
assess progress made in the implementation of national strategies and plans on 
non-communicable diseases.”198 As with the development of the SDGs, the process 
of science-driven consultation that WHO managed on NCDs has produced a highly 
legitimate outcome,199 the 2013 Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Non-Communicable Diseases. This includes nine goals, eight of which are precisely 
quantifiable, and 25 indicators for use by Member States.200 The Plan also provides 
multiple policy options for each Member State to choose from in pursuit of specific 
policy objectives, as well as proposing actions that can be taken by the UN Secretariat 
and international partners to strengthen responses in line with the plan.201 This 
outcome offers a model of principled pluralism. 
Lessons can also be drawn from the field of climate change. The IPCC reviews and 
assesses the existing “scientific, technical and socio-economic” evidence regarding 
climate change to advise UN Member States. It was created by the UN Environmental 
Programme and the World Meteorological Organisation, and subsequently endorsed 
by the General Assembly. Three IPCC working groups assess current research, 
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publications and data on three 
different topics and produce an 
assessment report roughly every 
five years. The Fourth Assessment 
Report included contributions 
from experts from more than 130 
countries over a six-year period, over 
450 lead authors, input from more 
than 800 contributing authors, and 
draft review by 2,500 experts.202 
An IPCC Bureau, comprised of 
independent experts, guides the 
work of the Panel, and an Executive 
Committee and Secretariat also 
support it.203 Roughly 50 scientists 
from each Working Group summarize 
their report into a Summary for 
Policymakers, which is then reviewed 
by governments and endorsed at 
a plenary session of government 
representatives. Through this 
process of deep and broad scientific 
consultation, the IPCC has developed unique global legitimacy as a reliable source of 
scientific assessment and advice on climate change, feeding into the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties204 and offering 
an important resource for Member States when designing national policy.205 
Each of these models holds lessons ahead of UNGASS 2016. The OWG process 
demonstrates the utility not only of an inclusive process, but also of framing policy 
discussion in terms of a search for shared, measurable goals. The WHO-led Non-
Communicable Diseases process demonstrates that this approach can also be 
applied in the area of medicine and public health, and that goals can be usefully 
coupled with a global plan of action that combines clear principles with flexible 
approaches to implementation. And the IPCC process demonstrates the unique 
legitimacy and utility of coupling inter-governmental debate with deep and broad 
scientific review, especially in an area where – as is the case for both climate change 
and global drug policy – the socio-economic impacts are complex and the science is 
evolving. UNGASS 2016 should draw on these insights to establish a structure for a 
science-driven conversation to prepare the ground for the adoption of a new Political 
Declaration and Plan of Action in 2019. 
A central focus of this mechanism should be the development of measurable goals 
(and associated indicators) for global drug policy. The 2009 Political Declaration and 
Plan of Action is vague in its identification of goals, aspirationally naming 2019 as 
a target date to “eliminate or significantly reduce” illicit cultivation, demand, drug-
related health and social risks, production, manufacture, marketing and distribution 
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of, and trafficking in illicit substances, and money-laundering.206 As laudable as 
these may be as policy objectives, they do not reflect the recent learning by the 
international community that precise, quantifiable global goals, targets and indicators 
are much more effective drivers of collective action, resource mobilization and policy 
change.207 The current Political Declaration does not allow Member States to track 
and monitor progress in any realistic way. Without an effective metric system, States 
are necessarily poorly informed as to what is working and what is not, and must guess. 
The good news is that some thinking about the data available to build such goals is 
already beginning to emerge, both out of intergovernmental forums – for example the 
2011 commitment by Member States in the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS to work 
towards reducing transmission of HIV among people who inject drugs by 50 per cent 
by 2015 – and through independent research and analysis.208 
Drawing on these insights, our final recommendation offers the outline of a model for 
a discussion of global drug policy between 2016 and 2019 that is 1) inclusive; 2) driven 
by science; 3) pro-development; and 4) human rights protecting:
Recommendation 6 – Towards 2019
Create an Open Working Group on Drug Policy to prepare  
Global Drug Policy Goals for adoption in 2019
UNGASS 2016 should establish an Open Working Group on Drug Policy (OWGDP). 
The OWGDP should sit in New York between UNGASS 2016 and 2019, and present 
a proposal to the General Assembly for a new Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action, including measurable Global Drug Policy Goals. The OWGDP should 
draw its inspiration from the Open Working Group that produced the Sustainable 
Development Goals, including its troika system for state representation, and 
its extensive consultations with the UN system, civil society and interested 
stakeholders. The OWGDP should include an expert Scientific Advisory Committee, 
supported by WHO, modelled on the IPCC process (and thus including not only 
Member State officials but also independent scientific experts), tasked with 
reviewing and summarizing the state of global scientific knowledge in specific issues 
areas, such as penal policy, drugs and development, and drugs and public health. 
The OWGDP should also include a Human Rights Advisory Committee, tasked with 
ensuring that the OWGDP’s proposal respects human rights. 
34
INTRODUCTION   |   CHAPTER 1   |   CHAPTER 2   |   CHAPTER 3   |   CHAPTER 4   |   CONCLUSION
Conclusion
The cracks in the global drug policy regime are increasingly clear. Calls for flexibility 
in the implementation of that regime could have one of two very different effects. 
Flexibility could allow states to drift apart, widening those cracks, until the regime 
fragments. Or it could – if coupled with a set of common principles that states agree 
underpin the regime – breathe new life into the regime, turning it into a framework 
based on principled pluralism that better integrates drug control with public health, 
development and human rights. 
Discussions at UNGASS 2016 may not be conclusive in determining which of these 
outcomes is ultimately realized, but they will set the direction of global drug control 
policy discussions for the years ahead, and have a major influence on what comes 
after the ‘War on Drugs’. The analysis we have presented in this report suggests that, 
as things stand, the likely outcome of UNGASS 2016 will not differ significantly from 
the status quo. The Sceptics have not presented a coherent set of policy alternatives, 
with clear pay-offs, that will convince Swing Voters to defect from acceptance 
of the law-enforcement based Orthodoxy. Instead, unless Member States begin 
unexpectedly to debate specific additional actions, UNGASS 2016 will likely affirm the 
current regime while adding largely rhetorical calls for flexibility, respect for human 
rights and promotion of public health. 
That, we suggest, risks setting the stage for what will ultimately prove to be a slow 
slide into regime fragmentation, as some states use the notion of flexibility as a basis 
for experimentation with new domestic policy approaches, while others use it as cover 
for punitive policy approaches. To avoid that outcome, we have argued, policy makers 
should use UNGASS 2016 to take a number of specific steps to advance discussions in 
areas of potential common ground – on penal policy, access to controlled medicines, 
drug use disorder treatment, human development metrics, and human rights. 
We have argued that UNGASS 2016 can be used to set up an ongoing, inclusive 
conversation that couples flexible national implementation with a set of clearly agreed 
global principles: protection of human rights, promotion of human development, 
and guidance by the best available scientific evidence. This conversation may help 
Member States to arrive at a common understanding of the development and other 
pay-offs that could be reaped from a new approach to drug control, and help them 
formulate a common vision of what comes after the War on Drugs. We have offered 
a model for organizing such a discussion – through an Open Working Group on 
Drug Policy that leads to the adoption of Global Drug Policy Goals in 2019. Whether 
Member States adopt that format, or some other approach, one thing is clear: 
unless they begin, soon, to consider concrete operational steps that they can take 
at UNGASS 2016, a golden opportunity to adapt the global drug control regime to 
present-day realities risks being squandered. 
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Finding Common Ground at UNGASS 2016 
Recommendation 1 – Penal Policy
Accelerate evidence sharing on drug control 
penal policy outcomes
UNGASS 2016 should create a forum to encourage states, international 
organizations, academics and civil society to share robust scientific evidence about 
a wide range of drug control penal policy interventions and their outcomes. This 
forum could provide a platform for South-South and triangular cooperation, and 
encourage the development of a stronger evidence base on penal policy ahead of 
the adoption of a new Political Declaration and Plan of Action in 2019.
Recommendation 2 – Access to Controlled Medicines
Establish a High-Level Independent Commission on access to 
controlled medicines
UNGASS 2016 should establish an high-level, independent, expert commission, 
supported by WHO, to analyse global access to controlled medicines and report 
back to the General Assembly or the UN Economic and Social Council, via the UN 
Secretary-General, on measures to improve it. 
Recommendation 3 – Drug Dependence Treatment
Develop UN-wide guidance on treatment of drug use disorders
UNGASS 2016 should request the Secretary-General to develop coherent, UN-
system-wide guidance on drug treatment programming, for application across UN 
programming contexts. 
Recommendation 4 – Human Development and Drug Control Metrics
Build new pro-development metrics to help prepare the next 
Political Declaration
Building on current discussions on drug control indicators for SDG 3.5 in the Inter-
Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators and the UN Statistical Commission, 
UNGASS 2016 should call on the UN Statistical Commission to initiate a formal 
workstream to develop new metrics measuring the human development impacts of 
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drugs and drug control policies. If possible, such data should begin to be collected 
by national statistical agencies ahead of 2019, to inform the preparation of a new 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action. 
Recommendation 5 – Human Rights
Develop UN-wide guidance on protection of human rights  
in drug programming
UNGASS 2016 should request the Secretary-General to task the UN System Task 
Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking to develop a system-
wide policy on protection of human rights in drug-related programming. This should 
operationalize, and build upon, the existing UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. 
Recommendation 6 – Towards 2019
Create an Open Working Group on Drug Policy to prepare  
Global Drug Policy Goals for adoption in 2019
UNGASS 2016 should establish an Open Working Group on Drug Policy (OWGDP). 
The OWGDP should sit in New York between UNGASS 2016 and 2019, and present 
a proposal to the UN General Assembly for a new Political Declaration and Plan 
of Action, including measurable Global Drug Policy Goals. The OWGDP should 
draw its inspiration from the Open Working Group that produced the Sustainable 
Development Goals, including its troika system for state representation, and 
its extensive consultations with the UN system, civil society and interested 
stakeholders. The OWGDP should include an expert Scientific Advisory Committee, 
supported by World Health Organization, modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change process (and thus including not only Member State officials 
but also independent scientific experts), tasked with reviewing and summarizing 
the state of global scientific knowledge in specific issues areas, such as penal 
policy, drugs and development, and drugs and public health. The OWGDP should 
also include a Human Rights Advisory Committee, tasked with ensuring that the 
OWGDP’s proposal respects human rights.
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